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COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIMITS OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDIC-
TION-IS THERE A FEDERAL COMMON LAw?-The Federal Court
Acts not only conferred upon the new Federal Court of Canada
the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Exchequer Court, it
also conferred some important new jurisdiction on the Federal
Court.= This expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal court
system has given rise to a host of cases attempting to define the
limits of the jurisdiction . These cases mainly turn on the language
of the Federal Court Act . However, there is also a constitutional
limit to the jurisdiction which can be conferred on a federal court,
and that is the subject of this comment .
The British North America Act," by section 101, empowers
the federal Parliament to establish federal courts "for the better
administration of the laws of Canada" . This language does not
authorize the establishment of courts of general jurisdiction akin
to the provincial courts . Federal courts are confined to issues
arising under "laws of Canada" . It is well settled that the phrase
"laws of Canada" does not mean all laws in force in Canada
whatever their source, but means federal laws . The clearest exam-
ple of a "law of Canada" is a federal statute, including of course
a regulation or order made under a federal statute . Much of the
subject matter of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court is governed
by federal statute law, and this part of the court's jurisdiction
raises no constitutional issue . But some of the subject matter of
the court's jurisdiction is governed by provincial statute law or
i S.C ., 1970-71-72, c. 1 .
2 Perhaps most important is the new power conferred by ss 18 and
28 to review the decisions of federal officials and agencies . Also important
is the new power conferred by s. 23 over certain bills of exchange and
promissory notes, aeronautics and interprovincial undertakings .






by . the common law, and this part of the court's jurisdiction does
raise a constitutional issue.
Until_ recently there was substantial judicial support for. the
view that a federal court could be given jurisdiction over any
matter in relation to which the federal Parliament had legislative
competence,, even if that matter was not in fact regulated by
federal statute law. ®n this basis the "laws of Canada" could
include a rule . of provincial statute law or a rule of the common
law if its subject matter was such that the law could have been
enacted or adopted by the federal Parliament .4 This test of federal
legislative competence gave to the undefined expression "laws of
Canada" a meaning which was sound in principle and relatively
easy to apply in practice . Yet, in two recent cases, the Supreme
Court of Canada has rejected the test-and without substituting
a satisfactory alternative..
The first of the two eases is Quebec North Shore Paper Co.
v. Canadian Pacific (1976), which was an action for damages
brought in the Federal Court by the Canadian Pacific railway
against the Quebec North Shore Paper Co., alleging the breach
of a contract to build a marine terminal. The building of this
facility by the paper company was part of a larger contract under
which the railway undertook to transport the company's newsprint
by water and land from a plant in Quebec to newspaper houses
in Chicago and blew York . The contract was made in Quebec
and it specifically provided that it was to be . interpreted in
accordance 'with the laws of Quebec .
Section 23 of the Federal Court Act purported to confer
jurisdiction on the Federal Court "in all cases in which a claim
for relief is made or a remedy is sought under an Act of the
Parliament of Canada or otherwise in relation to . . . works and
undertakings . . . extending beyond the limits of a province . . ." .
This language was literally apt to include Canadian Pacific's
4 Consolidated Distilleries v . . The King, [1933] A.C. 508 is ambiguous
on this point, but see Logan v. The King, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 145, at p. 155,
per Kerwin J . ; Schwella v . The Queen, [1957] Ex . C.R . 226, at p. 233,
per Thurlow J . ; The Queen v . J . B . & Sons Co., [1970] S.C.R. 220,
at pp . 232-233, per Pigeon J . ; Robert Simpson Montreal v . Hamburg-
Amerika, [1973] F.C . 1356, at pp . 1360, 1366, per Jackett C.J . ; Quebec
North Shore Paper Co. v . Canadian Pacific, [1976] 1 F.C . 646, at
pp . 652-653, per Le Dain J . ; McNamara Construction v . The Queen, [1976]
2 F.C . 292, at p . 303, per Thurlow J ., at p. 313, per Ryan J . The last
two decisions have now been reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada ;
they are the subject of this comment .
5 (1976), 71 D.L.R . (3d) 1l1 .
552
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL. LV
action . To be sure, the federal Parliament had not enacted any
laws which would apply to the contract . However, as a matter
of statutory interpretation, the words "or otherwise" in section 23
contemplated cases governed by law other than federal statute
law . And, as a matter of constitutional , law, the test of federal
legislative competence was satisfied : because the contract was
for the international transportation of goods, it was within the
legislative competence of the federal Parliament . For this reason
the Federal Court of Appeal had little difficulty in deciding that
section 23 of the Federal Court Act was constitutionally effective
in conferring jurisdiction over the action . 6 Le Dain J . for the
court reasoned that, in its application to a contract within federal
legislative jurisdiction, the Quebec civil law was a "law of Canada" .
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reversed the
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal . Laskin C.J., who wrote
for the full Supreme Court bench of nine judges, held that the
Quebec civil law could not be regarded as a "law of Canada"
unless it had actually been enacted or adopted by the federal
Parliament. He held that the words "for the better administration
of the laws of Canada" in section 101 of the British North
America Act did not mean matters within federal legislative com-
petence . Instead, he said, "they carry, in my opinion, the require-
ment that there be applicable and existing federal law . . . upon
which the jurisdiction of the Federal Court can be exercised" . 7
The Quebec law of contract, unlike that of the other
provinces, rests on the statutory foundation of the Quebec Civil
Code, which contains a code of the law of contract including
rules of interpretation . Strictly speaking, therefore, all that was
decided in Quebec North Shore was that provincial statute law
could not be a "law of Canada" . The question whether any part
of the common law could be regarded as federal did not have
to be decided . However, Laskin C.J.'s opinion made no mention
of the statutory basis of the Quebec civil law, which suggests
that the result would have been the same in a common law
province where the law of contract was not statutory. The correct-
ness of this inference is confirmed by the second recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada .
The second case is McNamara Construction v . The Queen
( 1977) . 11 This was an action for damages brought in the Federal
'> Supra, footnote 4 .
7 Supra, footnote S, at p. 120.




Court by the Crown in right of Canada (hereinafter referred to as
the federal Crown) against a builder and an architect, alleging
the breach of a' contract to build a penitentiary in Alberta. Once
again, the Federal Court Act was literally apt to include the
action, because section 17(4) purported to confer jurisdiction
over "proceedings of a civil nature in which the Crown or the
Attorney-General of Canada claims relief". It was common
ground that there was no federal statute law in point, and that
the applicable law was the common law. However, the Federal
Court of Appeal applied the test of federal legislative competence
(over the federal Crown (section 91(1A)) and over peniten-
tiaries (section 91(28))) to hold that the applicable common
law was "federal".9 The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously
reversed, holding that the applicable law was not federal, and
accordingly that the Federal Court could not, as a matter of
constitutional law, assume jurisdiction over the proceedings.
Laskin C.J . for the court followed Quebec North Shore in holding
that the fact of federal legislative competence over the contract
did not supply a sufficient constitutional basis for jurisdiction .
Nor did the fact that the federal Crown was the plaintiff in the
proceedings, because no "principle of law peculiar to it" was
relevant.l° Therefore, section 17(4) of the Federal Court Act
had to be "read down" so as to remain within the limits prescribed
by section 101 of the British North America Act.
Do the decisions in Quebec North Shore and McNamara
Construction mean that there is no such thing as a federal common
law," and that the federal Parliament may only confer upon the
Federal Court jurisdiction over controversies governed by federal
statute law?12 An affirmative answer would at least have the
appeal of providing a clear definition of "laws of Canada" in
section 101 of the British North America Act : "laws of Canada"
would consist exclusively of federal statute law. But this does not
') Supra, footnote 4.
io Supra, footnote 8, at p. 9. On this point the court had to overrule
a prior decision of its own, Farwell v. The Queen (1894), 22 S.C.R . 553,
although Laskin C.J . also suggested that Farwell had not had to decide
the point.
ii The existence of a federal common law is also relevant to the
scope of the Canadian Bill of Rights, although the closing language of
s. 5(2) of the Bill, R.S.C., 1970, Appendix III (which seems apt to include
common law as well as pre-confederation statute law) makes clear that
federal legislative competence is the test .
12 For the situation in the United States and Australia, see Hogg,
Liability of the Crown (1971), pp . 224-226.
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seem to be the meaning of the two cases, because in each of
them Laskin C.J . expressly acknowledged the existence of a
body of federal common law . In Quebec North Shore he gave as
an example the law pertaining to the federal Crown (insofar
as it is not statutory) .la In McNamara Construction, where the
federal Crown was the plaintiff, he explained that example as
meaning the law pertaining to Crown "liability", not Crown rights :
the difference is that "there were existing common law rules
respecting Crown liability in contract and immunity in tort, rules
which have been considerably modified by legislation" ; whereas,
claims by the Crown were governed by the ordinary law. 14 But
if the distinction between rights and liabilities is crucial, the
result is highly inconvenient . The Federal Court may be properly
seized of an action against the federal Crown, but the federal
Crown's counterclaim and third party notice will require a
separate action in the provincial court system . 15
Is there any principled basis for the distinction between
Crown rights and Crown liabilities? Laskin CT's example of
Crown "immunity" in tort is not helpful : Crown liability in tort
did not exist at common law and it now depends upon the fact
that the federal Crown has been made liable by a federal statute;ls
although the statute does not codify the rules which are applicable,
the relevant rules of the common law have been regarded as
adopted by the federal statute. 17 Laskin CT's example of Crown
liability in contract is even less helpful : Crown liability in contract
did exist at common law ; and, while there were a few special
rules applicable to the Crown, for the most part Crown liability
in contract depended upon the same rules of the common law as
applied between subject and subject."' It was (and is) no different
from the Crown's right to sue in contract, which also depended
for the most part upon the same rules of the common law as
applied between subject and subject . Certainly, there were some
common law rules which were peculiar to the Crown, but this
does not support a distinction between Crown liabilities and
13 Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 118, 120.
14 Supra, footnote 8, at p . 9 . .
15 Laskin C.J ., supra, footnote 8, at p . 10 said that proceedings for
contribution or indemnity could be competent "in so far as the supporting
federal law embraced the issues arising therein" . Presumably the qualifying
phrase will exclude most such proceedings .
is Crown Liability Act, R.S.C ., 1970, c . C-38, s . 2 ; Hogg, op . cit .,
footnote 12, ch . 5 .
17 Gibson, Interiurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism (1969),
47 Can. Bar Rev. 40, at pp . 46-49 .




Crown rights because the special rules concerned Crown rights
as well ~as Crown liabilities.l 9 Are we somehow supposed to
segregate those rules which are peculiar to the federal Crown and
call them "federal" laws, while characterizing the rules which are
the same as the rules applicable between subject and subject as
"provincial" laws? As a method of allocating jurisdiction between
two court systems, such a distinction seems to me to be utterly
unworkable .
In any event, what reason can be given for denying that the
common law in fields of .federal legislative jurisdiction is federal
law-part of the "laws of Canada"? In the case of the federal
Crown, the common law can probably only be changed by the
federal Parliament . A provincial law purporting to diminish the
federal Crown's rights, or to increase its liabilities, would probably
be held incompetent to the province, and if couched n general
terms would probably be held inapplicable to the federal Crown.2o
In what sense is it plausible to characterize the common law
pertaining to the federal Crown as provincial? In the case of
penitentiaries, or international transportation (and most other
matters within federal jurisdiction), the common law can be
changed by the provincial Legislatures as well as by the federal
Parliament . But there is no reason to characterize the law
pertaining to these matters as provincial, rather than as federal
and provincial . Surely, in fields of concurrent authority the
common law has a double aspect, and the dual classification would
be more appropriate.
In my opinion the only workable and principled test for a
"law of Canada" is the test of federal legislative competence
which prevailed before Quebec North' Shore and McNamara
Construction . Indeed, this test is confidently asserted to be the
law in Laskin's casebook on constitutional law, where he says:
"Laws of Canada" must also include common law which relates to
is For example; at common law the Crown was immune from discovery,
production of, documents and costs, whether it was suing or being sued,
limitation periods did not apply to suits by the Crown, and there were
special prerogative remedies available only to the Crown: op . cit ., 4bid .,
pp . 28-37; the doctrine of Crown privilege was available whether the
Crown was suing or being sued (and even when the Crown was not a
party at all) : op . cit., ibid., p. 41 ; and the rule that the Crown was not
bound by statutes except by express words or necessary implication
could- occasionally be relevant in suits by the Crown as well as suits
against the Crown : op. cit., ibid ., pp . 180-183.
=0 Gairthier v. The King (1918), 56 S.C.R . 176, but compare Dominion
Building Corp . v. Tlre King, 119331 A.C . 533 ; and see Gibson, op . cit.,
footnote 17, at p. 52 .
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the matters falling within classes of subjects assigned to the Parlia-
ment of Canada .21
And, later:
But, because the common law is potentially subject to overriding
legislative power, there is federal common or decisional law and pro-
vincial common or decisional law according to the matters respectively
distributed to each legislature by the B.N.A. Act.'-'2
Neither Quebec North Shore nor McNamara Construction
give any reason for rejecting this sensible approach. It is, of
course, true that the competence test has the effect of enabling
the Parliament to confer a broad jurisdiction on the Federal
Court of Canada, and thereby to further develop a dual court
system in Canada . Like many lawyers, I think that an extensive
dual court system is an unwise development. But, as Laskin C.J .
recently reminded us in the Anti-Inflation Reference,-3 the court
should not be concerned with "the wisdom or expediency or
likely success of a particular policy expressed in legislation" .
In any event the chief mischiefs of a dual court system are the
necessity of two sets of proceedings to dispose of what is essentially
one dispute, and the fostering of controversy as to which system
has jurisdiction over a particular proceeding . Both those mischiefs
are surely better remedied by the relatively clear rule of federal
legislative competence than by the opaque rule now announced
by the Supreme Court of Canada.= 4
P. W. HOGG*
LABOUR LAW- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE BASIC JURISDIC-
TION OF THE CANADA LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD-IS IT CON-
CURRENT WITH FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER?
The Background of the Board's Basic Jurisdiction
As a result of the 1925 Privy Council decision in Toronto
Electric Commissioners v. Snider' and the subsequent decision of
=1 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (4th ed . rev., 1975), pp . 792-
793 ; the same passage appears in the 3rd ed . rev., 1969, at p. 817.
22 Op . Cit., ibid . (4th ed .), p. 793; (3rd ed .), p. 817. See also the
advocacy of a federal common law in Laskin, The British Tradition in
Canadian Law (1969), pp . 129-130.
-3 [19761 2 S.C.R . 373, at p. 425.
°} 1 am grateful to Professor John Evans, who read a draft version
of this comment and made many suggestions for its improvement .
'- P. W. Hogg, of the Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
1 [1925] A.C . 396, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5, [1925] 1 W.W.R . 785 (P.C .) .
